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JUDGES IN THE STORM: THE JUDICIAL REVIEW DEBATE
Munyaradzi Gwisai
Lecturer, Public Law Department, University of Zimbabwe
THE JUDGES IN THE STORM
The promulgation of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Labour Relations) 
Regulations, 1998,1 in November 1998 has brought a major simmering controversy in 
Zimbabwe to the boil. The regulations outlaw and make a criminal offence all "unlawful 
collective action," the latter expression being defined in very broad terms.2
The legality of the regulations turns on the question of whether they are lawful in terms of 
the enabling legislation and the Constitution, and this is an interpretation question.3 This 
raises the issue of the extent of the powers of the courts to declare legislative measures 
invalid. Major controversy has erupted in legal scholarship and within the judiciary over 
the legitimacy of the use of the judicial review process as a tool of judicial social engineering 
by the Dumbutshena and Gubbay Courts.4
The regulations are a jurisprudential minefield that will finally expose the character and 
nature of the Gubbay Court, a thing that has hirtheto been difficult to do because of the
1. Statutory Instrument 368A of 1998.
2. s2 defines "unlawful collective action" as meaning: "... any strike, boycott, lock-out, sit-in, sit-out, 
stay-away or other such concerted action on the part of employers or employees which constitutes a 
breach of any contract of employment and which —
(a) is prohibited in terms of subsection (3) of section 104 of the principal Act; or 
(a) is engaged in wholly or mainly for the purpose of —
(i) resisting any law or lawful measure of the Government; or
(ii) inducing or compelling the Government to alter any law or lawful measure."
3. The issues raised include whether the regulations are infra vires the enabling Act, the Presidential 
Powers (Temporary Measures) Act, Chapter 10:20, and the constitutionality of the regulations viz 
issues such as separation of powers, the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and 
association.
4. For debates on the issue in various jurisdictions including the USA, Canada, India and South Africa 
see generally Davis D., Chaskalson M & De Waal}., "Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of 
Constitutional Interpretation" in van Wyk, Dugard J, de Villiers B & Davis D., Rights and 
Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order (Juta, SA, 1994) 1. In Zimbabwe, for similar debates, 
there have been those who have argued generally against judicial activism like Hlatshwayo B., "Judicial 
Activism and Development — Warning Signals from Zimbabwe" (1991-1992) Vols. 9-10 Zim.L.Rev. 4; 
Hlatshwayo B., "Order in the Courts: Judicial Activism and Restraint," (1997) Vol. 9 No. 4 Legal Forum 
14; van Horn A., "Redefining Property: The Constitutional Battle Over Land Distribution in 
Zimbabwe" (1994) 38 JAL 144; Madhuku L., "Constitutional Interpretation and the Supreme Court as 
a Political Actor: Some Comments on United Parties v Minister of Justice, Legal and Pa-liamentary 
Affairs "(1998) Vol. 10 No.l Legal Forum 48. On the judicial front see similar sentiments expressed by 
Gubbay CJ in Chairman PSC & Ors v ZIMTA & Ors 1996 (1) ZLR 637, (the Bonus Case).
And on the other hand are those who have supported judicial activism in varying degrees like 
Linington G., "Is Parliament's Right to Amend the Constitution Limited?" (1996) Vol. 8 No. 3 Legal 
Fomm 23; The Reviewer, "A Retreat of Judicial Review" Legal Forum, Ibid., p 11; Biti T., "The Judiciary, 
the Executive and the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe" (unpublished article, 1997). At the judicial level see 
Zimmt Insurance Co. v Chawanda 1990 (2) ZLR 364.
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confusing signals that have come from that court over the last decade.5 The calm of the 
preceding years allowed the court to disguise its true ideological colours: — acting as the 
friend of liberal democracy in some instances6 whilst suppressing it in others.7 But that 
time is gone. In the storm of social struggles that now engulfs Zimbabwe, there can be no 
room for fence-sitting.
In this article we assess some of the debates that have taken place on the question of judicial 
activism, judicial review and the role of the judiciary in the realisation of liberal democracy. 
In particular we focus on the controversy over models of constitutional interpretation and 
what bearing this has in complex cases like those dealing with the Presidential Powers 
(Temporary Measures) (Labour Relations) Regulations.
LITERALISM V CONTEXTUALISM
Two broad schools on judicial activism may be ascertained. On the one side is the traditional 
bourgeois school of interpretation, which sees the role of the courts in the strict Diceyean 
sense of separation of powers — the role of the courts is to enforce the will of the legislature. 
To do this the judiciary must be guided by the literal rule. Du Toit has styled this the 
"literalist-cum-intentionalist" model of interpretation.8
In terms of such model the "words of a statute are to be given their ordinary, grammatical 
meaning unless this would lead to a patently absurd or unjust result, in which case certain 
contextual aids may be invoked".9 Courts must apply the literal meaning of the text to get 
to the purpose of the legislature and not their own values or morals. The legislature enjoys 
the power of making value decisions or policies because it represents the will of the majority 
of society and is more attuned to its needs.10 1Such principles apply to the interpretation of 
both the constitution and general statutes, as no distinction is drawn between the two. As 
Fieldsend CJ observed in Hewlett v Minister of Finance:'1
5. Compare for instance Gubbay CJ's position in Rattigan & Ore v Chief Immigration Officer 1994 (2) ZLR 
54 calling upon the judiciary "to make the Constitution grow and develop to meet the needs of an 
everchanging society.. and his statements in Chairman PSC & Ore v ZIMTA & Ors 1996 (1) ZLR 637 
where he observed "It is immaterial that the legislative measure may be unreasonable, impolitic or 
retrospective or that it impinges on existing rights... it must be upheld whatever the court may think 
of it." Or compare his statements in opening the 1991 Legal Year in his "Essential Features" speech 
and his "Search for the Truth" speech at the opening of the 1998 Legal Year — quoted infra, at p 34 
and p 44 respectively.
6. For instance in Munhumeso & Ors v A-G 1994 (1) ZLR 49, declaring restrictions on the freedom of 
assembly and association unlawful.
7. Chairman PSC & Ors v ZIMTA 6  Ors 1996 (1) ZLR 637 denying government workers their bonus.
8. du Toit D., Woolfrey D., Murphy J., Godfrey., Bosch D. & Christie S„ The Labour Relations Act of 1985 
(Butterworths, Durban, 1996).
9. Ibid., Madhuku L., supra note 140 p 50.
10. Dissenting judgement of Mcnally JA in SvA  Juvenile 1989 (2) ZLR 61. See also Gubbay CJ in Nyambirai 
v NSSA 1995 (2) ZLR 422, wherein he said, "I do not doubt that because of their superior knowledge 
and experience of society and its needs, and familiarity with local conditions, national authorities 
are, in principle, better placed than the judiciary to appreciate what is in the public benefit... *
11. 1981 ZLR 571 (S). Also see Madhuku L., supra, at p 50 for endorsement of such a view.
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. . .  in general the principles governing the interpretation of a constitution are basically 
no different from those governing the interpretation of any other legislation.
Thus for instance such an interpretation would give Parliament wide berth to amend the 
Constitution as it sees fit, as long as the two-thirds procedural requirements of s 52(1) are 
met.
The other broad school is the so-called purposive model or contextualist school. This rejects 
the literalist model's view that the starting point is the literal application of the legislation. 
Rather the courts are supposed to take "a  more contextually-sensitive and value-coherent 
approach". Devenish puts it thus:
A purposive methodology looks beyond the manifested intention. The purposive 
theory has its ratio in the fact that a statute is a legislative communication between 
the legislature and the public that is 'inherently purposive.' The interpreter must 
endeavour to infer the design or purpose which lies behind the legislation. In order to 
do this the interpreter should make use of an unqualified contextual approach, which 
allows an unconditional examination of all intentional and external sources.12
In particular, a distinction is drawn when it comes to constitutional interpretation involving 
constitutions with justiciable Bills of Rights,13 in which the purposive model should be 
used even m ore to  realise the values underlying the Constitution, the so-called  
constitutionalism doctrine.14
12. Devenish G E., Interpretation of Statutes (Juta, Johannesburg, 1992) p 36; In the labour law context, 
application of the same approach is supported by various authors including du Toit, supia note 144 p 
44; Rycroft A., & Jordan B., A Guide to South African Labour Law (Juta, Cape Town, 1992) p 29. Such 
model of interpretation was used in the minority judgement of Muchechetere JA in Chidiva & Ors v 
Zimbabwe hon & Steel Co. Ltd. SC No-137-97 at p 18 on what amounts to waiver. And also Chiworese v 
Rixi Taxi Services Co-Op Society HH 13-93.
13. Minister of Home Affairs &Anor v Fisher &Anor (1980) AC 319; (1979) 3 All ER 21 (PC), cited approvingly 
as the locus classicas in constitutional interpretation in Marumahoko v Chairman, PSC & Anor 1991 91 
ZLR 27 (HC); Adam J. See McNally JA's rather reluctant acceptance of the same value in Chairman of 
the Public Service Commission & Ors v Hall S- 49-89, where he draws a distinction in the power of 
parliament under constitutions with justiciable Bills of Rights and those without. Consistent with 
that reluctance of invoking constitutional arguments, McNally JA declined to go into the issue of 
whether restrictions on unregistered trade unions under s30 of the Labour Relations Act, Chapter 
28:01 violates the freedom of association and assembly. Agricultural Labour Bureau & General Agricultural 
and Plantation Workers' Union v Zimbabwe Agro-Industry Workers' Union S.C. 126/98, at p 8, where he 
observed: "This Court cannot and does not claim any expertise in what is fundamentally a matter of 
policy, to be determined by the Registrar, namely the question whether or not it is desirable to have 
more than one Trade Union in this industry." See section 3 of the Constitution which reads: "This 
Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution 
that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." See also, Chairman, PSC & Ors v 
ZIMTA & Ors 1997 (1) S A 209, where the court affirmed that Zimbabwe is a "constitutional democracy" 
although in this case such point was raised to buttress the court's acquiescence with arbitrary executive 
activity.
14. For supporting and counter arguments see, Davis D., supra p 2; Botha C. J., Statutory Interpretation: An 
Introduction for Students (Juta, SA, 1996) p 153; Linington G., supia note 140. See also Chaskalson M., et 
al, supra note 140 where the authors aver that"... the approach to constitutional interpretation which 
says the meaning of the Constitution is to be found in the intention of its drafters is fundamentally 
flawed. Nor is the meaning of the Constitution to be found in a simple decoding of the written text. 
Rather the meaning of the Constitution is to be determined with reference to its underlying values 
and commitments."
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In terms of such doctrine there are certain fundamental values or "essential features" 
underlying a democratic constitution that cannot be amended or destroyed even by a 
democratic government. These include equal participation of citizens in the democratic 
process,15 and "the institution and preservation of a democratic form of government; the 
establishment of a system of separation of pow ers... and finally, the enunciation and 
preservation of basic human rights".16
Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay in opening the 1991 Legal Year in Harare echoed similar 
views observing:
a constitution stands on certain fundamental principles which are its structural pillars.
If these pillars are demolished or even damaged the constitutional edifice will fa ll. . .  
there is an implied limitation on the power given under s52(l) which precludes 
Parliament from abrogating or changing the identity of the Constitution or any of its 
basic features. Consequently any law which has that effect would be pronounced 
invalid by the judiciary.17
In the realm of constitutional interpretation, constitutionalism has given rise to a number 
of interpretation presumptions, which have been overtly and openly supported by the 
courts in a number of cases.18 These include that the constitution must be "interpreted so 
as best to carry out its objectives and promote its purposes and should therefore be 
interpreted generously and purposively and should riot be given a narrow, artificial or 
pedantic interpretation;19 rights and freedoms are not to be diluted or diminished unless 
necessity or intractability of language dictates otherwise and derogations from rights should 
be given a strict and narrow rather than wide interpretation;20 and there is a duty on the 
courts to make the Constitution grow and develop to meet the needs of an ever-changing 
society which is part of the wider human society.21 2
The purposive model therefore asserts and admits the law-making function of the judges, 
in particular the use of the substantial judicial review process (SJR) as a tool of social 
engineering. It makes liberal use of SJR using the ultra vires doctrine to strike down 
legislation deemed in violation of the values underlying the statute, as opposed to merely 
restricting itself to procedural judicial review, which looks at whether stipulated procedures 
have been adhered to. In PF ZAPU v Minister of Justice (2)n Dumbutshena CJ said:
15. Davis D., supra note 140, 2.
16. Linington G., supra note 140. Linington and Gubbay CJ (above) do not openly articulate their 
justifications for coming up with such theory, but mechanically draw legitimacy from the Indian 
Kesavananda line of cases. For instance in Kesavamnda v State of Kerala AIR 1973 sc 1461, Khana J 
stated that the word "amendment" postulates that the old constitution survives without loss of its 
identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subject to alterations. For a critique 
of the same see, Davis D., supra note 140 p 41.
17. Quoted in Linington G., "Is Parliament's Right to Amend the Constitution Limited?" (1996) Vol. 8, 
No. 3 Legal Forum 23.
18. For a compilation of constitutional and human rights cases, see Feltoe G., "Fundamental Human 
Rights Cases" (1996) Vol. 8 No. 1 Legal Forum 25 (an update is contained in the 1999 issue).
19. CC]P v AC & Ors 1993 (1) ZLR 242 (S) at p 252-253; Rattigan & Ors v Chief Immigiation Officer & Ors S- 
64-94 at p 12-13.
20. Munhumeso & Ors v AG 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S); Minister of Home Affairs & Anor v Fisher & Anor (1979) 3 All 
ER 21 PC at 26A-E.
21. Rattigan & Ors v Chief Immigration Officer & Ors, ibid.
22. 1985 (1) ZLR 305 (SC) at p 318.
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the President, in the exercise of his powers ... is supposed to act lawfully and 
reasonably. If he acts unlawfully or unreasonably to the detriment of the rights of 
citizens, the courts . . . have jurisdiction to review the exercise under those 
circumstances of the President's actions.
An acute example of the application of the same, is when the judiciary seeks to limit the 
power of the legislature to change or amend the constitution, even where the latter has 
met the constitutional procedural requirements for effecting such amendments, as for 
instance the two-thirds assent vote under s52 (2a) of the Zimbabwe Constitution. Some 
courts have restrictively read such power to amend such that any amendment that amounts 
to a destruction of an "essential feature" of the Constitution would be struck down. As 
Khanna J observed in the Kesavananda v State of Kerala case:
... the word 'amendment' postulates that the old constitution survives without loss of 
its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subject to 
alterations.23
McNally JA, rather atypical, reluctantly uses a similar line of argument in Chairman of the 
Public Service Commission & Ors v Hall S -  49-89, where in assessing the validity of a Public 
Service Commission action denying an employee the right to be heard in violation of the 
audi alteram partem maxim observed:
It may be that in a countiy with a justiciable Bill of Rights one cannot apply the dictum 
of Stratford ACJ in Sack v Minister of Justice. .. where he said: 'Sacred though the maxim 
(audi alteram partem) is held to be, Parliament is free to violate it'. Even if Parliament 
were free to violate it, one might ask whether a surbodinate authority such as the 
Commission is free to do so.
It is this aspect of the exercise of judicial review that irks Madhuku and Hlatshwayo, who 
feel that this is a violation of liberal democratic values, because judges lack the moral 
authority to make value-laden laws since they are not elected.24 In the USA such an outlook 
has become known as the "countermajoritarian difficulty". One scholar of a similar outlook 
has observed:
when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative a c t . . .  it thwarts the 
will o f . . .  the people of the here and now; it exercises control, not on behalf of the 
prevailing majority, but against i t . .. judicial review is a deviant institution in American 
democracy.25
However, this is a mechanical and artificial conception of the judicial process. The reality 
is that there is no fundamental difference between the two models. Under both models 
judges do make value-laden decisions and laws. Where the results of a literal interpretation 
do not suit them, the literalist? can always evoke the Golden or Mischief rules and other 
traditional com m on law interpretation presumptions such as that harsh, unjust or
23. AIR 1973 SC 1461. See footnote 185 below for the conflict between the Indian court and government 
over the authority of the government-legislature to amend the Constitution as it desired as long as 
the necessary constitutional procedures had been met. The same arguments earlier used by the Indian 
court underlay Gubbay Cj's "essential features" speech, cited above. Justice McNally uses a similar 
argument in Chairman of the PSC & Ors v Hall S -  49-89. Adam J gives a good summary of the evolution 
of the contextualist SJR in Marumahoko v Chairman of the PSC & Anor, 1991 (1) ZLR 27, 43.
24. supra, note 140.
25. Bickle A., The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) quoted in Davis D., supra note 140, 6.
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unreasonable results are not intended;26 and that unless explicitly stated, the legislature 
does not intend to encroach on rights already gained and that where two interpretations 
are possible, the one that does the least violence to rights already established will be used.27
Further, the very broad wording of constitutions and statutes gives rise to value-laden 
decisions, whichever model of interpretation one uses. For instance the phrase "reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society" found in a number of sections of the Constitution28 can 
be interpreted variously depending on one's ideological premises.29
Madhuku is forced to admit that a degree of discretion is inevitable:
The conclusion to be drawn is that whilst some degree of judicial originality and 
activism is unavoidable given the very nature of constitutional language, there is a 
level beyond which this activism should not go.30
But still he fails to tell us the appropriate threshold or level which must not be transgressed. 
Madhuku's dilemma is not surprising. The reality is that both systems do allow judges to 
exercise a high degree of value discretion, depending on their particular objectives. Du 
Plessis & Corder argue that the literalists' presumption that words can have a clear, literal 
meaning is fundamentally flawed:
There is, as matter of fact, no such thing as a clear and unambiguous language in the 
abstract (or even in context prior to its meaning having been established). The language 
of a statute can, in other words, only be said to be clear once its meaning, interwoven 
with its full intra- and extra-textual structure has somehow been determined. This 
means that anyone asserting that the meaning of a statute is obvious because its 
language is clear, is either so familiar with the context that s/he takes it for granted or 
has previously interpreted the statute intuitively or subconsciously and has in neither 
instance taken precautions to limit her or his personal predilections and prejudices.31
The difference between the two models is historical and in form. The traditional literal 
model is the preferred tool of analytical positivism or laissez-faire and prospering capitalism, 
where there is consensus between the executive and judiciary arms of the state in the 
enforcement of "the rule of law". It allows law to play one of its primary roles under 
capitalism, namely being the paramount hegemonic ideological tool of the ruling class. It 
is the legal manifestation of analytical positivism. Under the myth of separation of powers 
and rule of law, judges are painted as neutral enforcers of the will of the majority as 
represented by laws passed by parliament.
26. Kruse v Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91. These principles have been incorporated into Zimbabwean law in a 
number of cases, including S v Delta Consolidated (Pvt) Ltd & Ors 1991 (2) ZLR 234 (S) and PF-ZAPU v 
Minister of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs 1985 (1) ZLR 305 (S); See also Secretary foi' Transport & 
Anor v Makwavarara 1991 (1) ZLR 18 (SC); G. Feltoe, supra note 140 p 7.
27. S v Galgut's Garage (Pty) Ltd 1969 SA 459 (A); Shabalala v Attorney-Geneial, Transvaal 1994 6 BCLR 85 
(T) at 100; Botha C J, supra note 150.
28. For instance, sections — 16(7); 17(2); 19(5); 20(2); 21(3); 22(3); and 23(5).
29. See different perceptions of Gubbay and Adam on what constitutes "reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society", infra.
30. Madhuku L., supra note 140.
31. Du Plessis & Corder., Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights ( Juta, Cape Town, 1994)
p 66.
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But as history has shown, adherents of such ideology are not averse to applying SJR norms, 
under the cover of the golden rule and so forth, against a reformist state, in order to protect 
bourgeois private property and values.32
On the other hand, contextualist SJR is the preferred model of reformist liberalism, such as 
that influenced by sociological and realist jurisprudence, in particular when faced with a 
conservative status quo executive, as was the case with the Zimbabwe bench in the late 
1980's and early 1990's. Further, the contextualists believe that the legitimacy of the bench 
arises not so much from being seen as a neutral enforcer of laws but a caring-just- 
compassionate enforcer of law.
The one model is therefore more open about what it is doing, whereas the other seeks to 
disguise this. The traditional interpretation model favoured by Madhuku and Hlatshwayo 
sows false illusions about what the judges actually do. It allows judges to apply their own 
ideological outlooks without having to offer any systematic justification for so doing. And 
as history has shown they have usually done so in a reactionary and right-wing manner 
that suppresses rights and freedoms. No wonder why such model has been criticised as 
"primitive, naive and antiquated".33
On the other hand, purposive SJR admits to its value-laden law —  making process but 
seeks to justify it on the basis of some articulated value or ideological system, namely 
constitutionalism or liberal democracy.
At the end of the day the real issue is not whether judicial activism is per se bad or good. 
The substantive results or consequences of its use in particular circumstances is what 
matters. The major inarticulate premises of the court/judge plays an important role in 
this. But paramount in the question of whether SJR or judicial activism in general is always 
a negative phenomenon or a negation of liberal democracy, is the particular historical 
situation and social context of the court-judge. It is therefore a dialectical issue. In certain 
historical eras or situations it has been used to advance bourgeois rights, in particular 
political and civil rights such as in its contexualist or purposive version, as for instance 
under the Dumbutshena Court and early Gubbay Court34 or the Warren Court in the USA,35
32. See for instance the conservative Rehnquist Bench in the USA appointed under Presidents Reagan 
and Bush has used judicial activism to entrench such an unjust status quo. for instance holding 
affirmative action to be presumptively unconstitutional, Davis D., supra note 140, pp 7-8. Previously 
in the early 20th century the court had used judicial activism through the notorious economic due 
process doctrine to strike down social welfare legislation as violating the freedom of liberty of 
capitalists. The most famous such decision being Lochner v New York 198 US 483 (1954) striking down 
as unconstitutional state laws that limited the number of hours an employee may work in a week. 
For a similar situation in India see below, note 185.
33. Quoted in Devenish G E., supra,. Lord Denning, one of the most eminent judges from the/ons et origo 
of literalism, the UK, has also observed: "even in interpreting our own legislation, we should do well 
to throw aside our traditional approach and adopt a more liberal attitude. We should adopt such a 
construction as will 'promote the general legislative purpose' underlying the provision." In Denning 
A., The Discipline of Law (Butterworths, London, 1979) p 21.
34. see cases like PF ZAPU v Minister of Justice 1985 (1) ZLR 305 (on limitations to executive discretion); S 
v A Juvenile 1989 (2) ZLR 61 (asserting equal rights in constitutional protection between juveniles and 
adults); CCJP v AC 1993 (1) ZLR 246 (on rights of prisoners on death row); Munhumeso & O s  v AG 
1994 (1) ZLR 49 (on the vital importance of the right to assemble and association).
35. See Marumahoko v Chairman of the PSC, supra note 159, p 43; infra note 185 and also see Davis D., supra 
note 140, p 7 where they argue that one such famous case was that of Griaworld v Connecticut 381 US 
479 (1965) where it was held that a state law limiting access to contraception was in violation of the
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whilst in other situations SJR has been used to defend an unjust status quo, favouring a 
minority at the expense of the majority in particular where it relates to property rights and 
in times of political turmoil. Examples include India and Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe the 
immediate post-independence bench used judicial activism to defend South African spies 
and saboteurs or to protect bourgeois private property.36 This reality has now been exposed 
by the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, in which such 
saboteurs who were allowed to go scot-free by the courts, indeed admitted to their nefarious 
activities. A similar trend is the quasi feudal-natural law values represented in a number of 
Justice McNally's judgements in family law cases upholding the oppression of women 
and young people.37 In India, during the first three decades of independence, the courts 
formed the bulwark of resistance to social transformative measures introduced by the 
reformist Nehru governm ent, including appropriation of property at governm ent- 
determined compensation levels. Relying on the so-called "essential features" doctrine the 
courts declared invalid constitutional amendments passed by the legislature, as certain 
rights, including property, were held to be inviolable in all circumstances.38 39
The same danger lies in South Africa today, where a judiciary inherited lock, stock and 
barrel from the apartheid era is most likely to apply judicial activism in a way hostile to the 
reformist efforts of the post apartheid government. This is what make Davis et al, sceptical 
about the use of SJR in the current South African context:
Given the possibility that the use of a flexible constitutional theory is as likely to 
produce a conservative as a liberal jurisprudence, earlier calls for judicial activism in 
the South African context might prove inappropriate to a transformative political 
enterprise.99
The real challenge for those seeking to expand the horizons of liberal democracy is to be 
guided by the substantive results from the judicial law-making process as opposed to the 
mechanist one of the tools used. In many circumstances, the contexualist SJR is a progressive, 
albeit reformist tool, that should be defended. At the end of the day the question is not
right to privacy although such right is not specified in the constitution itself. The court justified itself 
on the grounds that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance".
36. Hewlett v Minister o f Finance & Anor 1981 ZLR 571; Bickle & Ors v Minister of Home Affairs 1983 ZLR 
400; Austin & Anor v Minister of State (Security) & Anor 1987 (1) ZLR; Austin & Harper v Minister o f State 
Security & Anor & Commissioner of Zimbabtve Republic Police 1986 (1) ZLR 174; Minister of Home Affairs 
& Anor v Austin & Harper 1986 (1) ZLR 240 (SC) and Bull v Attroney-Geneial & Anor 1986 (1) ZLR 117 
(SC). See a good criticism of such decisions in Ghutto S B O & Makamure K., "Judicial Subversion 
under the Cloak of Legality? The Judgement in the Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle & Ors "  (1985) 3 
Zim. L. Rev. 119. Indeed the authors have since been vindicated by the report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa in which such sabouteurs have since admitted to their 
nefarious activities. See The Zimbabwe Minor, 4 December 1998.
37. See for instance his dissenting judgement in S v A Juvenile, supra and in Ruwodo v NO v Minister of 
Home Affairs SC 42-95.
38. Infra note 185.
39. This has already happened in a case where the exercise of presidential discretion in appointing a 
commission into the apartheid stronghold of rugby administration, was held to be reviewable by the 
courts and President Mandela was hauled before the courts to be questioned on the exercise of such 
discretion. This is perhaps why Davis et al, supra note at p. 7 are sceptical if not fearful of judicial 
activism in the South African context of an unrehabilitated judiciary.
+ ■
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whether the judges are exercising value-laden discretion, but how and in whose favour 
they are exercising it. Where the character of the bench or judges expands rights, whatever 
tool used, it must be supported, but where the bench resists or is an obstacle to change 
whether against the state or not, and whether using the traditional interpretation model or 
SJR, it must be opposed.
In the context of Zimbabwe, the use of purposive SJR had exhibited a positive side in the 
expansion of bourgeois rights against a conservative status quo, and hence the bench 
deserved some conditional support, especially in the civil and political rights arena. To 
base one's argument on a mechanical premise, namely what interpretation tool has been 
used, is very naive and dangerous in a situation where the executive-legislature itself is 
highly undemocratic and unaccountable as Zanu(PF) is in Zimbabwe. Such arguments 
will be easily used by incumbent dictatorships to justify their attack on basic bourgeois 
democratic rights.
NO ILLUSIONS IN COURTS
However, unlike the liberals, we must not have illusions about the utility of contextualist 
SJR as a fundamental tool for social change. Whilst it is only slightly better than the 
traditionalist model, it still remains hemmed within the confines of bourgeois law. It is not 
substantially different from the other model. The reality is that all bourgeois courts, reformist 
or not, retain a class character. Like all law contextualist SJR or judicial activism has class 
limitations to its declared ambition of social engineering.
In the first place we must appreciate that the interpretation process, in particular the 
constitutional one, largely involves a balancing and weighing in of potentially conflicting 
values and rights.40 Whilst contextualist SJR tells us that it is the duty of the court to promote 
rights and so forth, it does not tell us what to do where there is a conflict of such rights —  
how are constitutional rights to be prioritised? For instance in trade union matters, how is 
the potential conflict between the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and 
association of workers to be reconciled with that of private property of the boss?;41 or the 
conflict between the need for certainty and stability in law represented by the sanctity of 
contract doctrine derived from the property right and that of freedom of work-employment- 
trade derived from the freedom of movement section in restraints in employment clauses.42
40. A rare admission of this is to be found in McNally's dissenting judgement in S v A Juvenile 1989 (2) 
ZLR 61. See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters vtianke, infra note 52.
41. Masukusa v National Foods Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR 66. A good example of such conflict has also been reflected 
in US labour jurisprudence. Under pressure from rising labour militancy in the 1930s the court had 
ruled in favour of a wide right to picket as part of the freedom of expression in Thornhill v Alabama 
310 US 88 (1940) but with the waning of such struggles in the wake of the Mcathyite Red Terror of the 
1950s, the court in upholding the enjoining of pickets merely on the basis that the state court had 
disapproved of the trade union's objectives, the majority of the court suggested that it was proper for 
the courts to balance competing economic interests: International Brotherhood o f Teamsters v Hanke, 339 
US 470 (1950). In Hudgens v NLRB 424 U.S. 507 (1976) the majority upheld the property right of 
capitalists to deny the freedom of expression and right of workers to picket on private property 
(shopping mall) even if it was generally available to the public. See generally Goldman S., Constitutional 
Law: Cases and Essays (Harper & Row, New York, 1987) pp. 471-473.
42. As in Mangwana v Mparadzi 1989 (1) ZLR 79 and Book v Davidson 1988 (1) ZLR 365 where courts 
changed prevailing law on public policy viz. restraint of trade clauses, holding that the doctrine of 
sanctity of contract prevailed over that of freedom of trade. See Nherere P., "No Requiem for the 
Restraint Doctrine — Yet" (1988) 6 Zim. L.R. 1.
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How far can the judges be trusted to exercise judicial review to uphold democracy, when 
they themselves are the antithesis of democracy in so far as they are un-elected?
The reality is that in balancing the conflicting interests between the fundamental classes 
under capitalism, namely the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the judiciary, whatever 
characteristic or model they use, will be influenced by their class prejudices, sometimes 
mediated through racial, sexual and tribal prisms. In the true Poundian sense of the "taught 
doctrine" a true contextualist SJR court will apply progressive values selectively. It will be 
more liberal in upholding political-civil rights which do not undermine property rights in 
a fundamental manner, but remain conservative in those areas key to the needs of capital, 
in particular those upholding the sanctity of bourgeois private property. An example is the 
case of National Foods Ltd. v Masukusa & Anor,° involving a conflict between the property 
rights of the capitalist and the freedom of expression of the worker. In upholding the 
dismissal of a black employee who had called the employer's black managers 'Uncle Toms' 
and disparaged the government's reconciliation policy as selling out, the court held:
While he (the worker) was certainly entitled to his views and to pronounce them, he 
was not entitled to use his workplace as a platform to advocate revolution.43 4
The bottom line is that, whatever differences may exist within the judiciary, ultimately, the 
judges are there to protect the class rule, property and profits of the bourgeoisie. As the 
great Bolshevik revolutionary, V.I. Lenin observed:
In capitalist society, providing it develops under the most favourable conditions, we 
have more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy 
is always hammered in by the narrow limits set by capitalist exploitation, and 
consequently, always remains, in effect, a democracy for the minority, only for the 
propertied classes, only for the rich.45
Secondly and more importantly, any tension arising between the executive and the judiciary 
by use of one or the other process is short-lived, because of the social role of the state, 
namely to protect the general interest of the bourgeois ruling class. In times of heightened 
social struggle, the artificial division between the executive and judiciary is swept away 
before the paramount need to protect the rule of the bourgeoisie. Because of its very 
composition, drawn from the bourgeois classes, the court will recoil from defending political 
and civil rights, where this has become a threat to the conditions of accumulation and 
exploitation. Should it fail to do so, the judiciary will come in conflict with the executive, 
and because of the relative balance of power weighed in favour of the latter, the judges 
must either give in or be swept aside. As the Indian liberal judge, Justice Khanna, was 
forced to admit:
There is no modern instance, ... in which any judiciary has saved a whole people 
from the grave currents of intolerance, passion and tyranny which have threatened 
liberty and free institutions, The attitude of a society and of its organised political
43. 1995 (2) ZLR 199 (SC).
44. Compare such views with those espoused in Retrofit (Pvt) Ltd. & Anor v PTC & Anor 1995 (2) ZLR 199 
where the court in annulling the state monopoly in the telecommunications industry declared that 
"the freedom of expression is a vitally important right that is an indispensable condition for a free 
society." See note 185 infra, for similar situation in India.
45. V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1981) p 83.
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forces rather than of its legal machinery, is the controlling force in the character of free 
institutions. The ramparts of defence against tyranny are ultimately in the hearts of 
the people.'*6
History is full of other examples, ranging from India to the USA.46 7 Such was the stark 
choice that faced Rhodesian judges, after the declaration of UDI in 1965. The few who did 
not agree with the constitutionality of the new state were forced to resign, whilst most of 
the judges adapted themselves to the new regime.48
The Gubbay Court has similarly backed down after concerted executive rejection of its 
reformist decisions through the constitutional amendments of the early 1990s. When Chief 
Justice Gubbay, reminiscent of the 1960s Indian Court, pronounced his "essential features" 
speech in the Opening of the 1991 Legal Year, in which he said the judiciary would declare 
invalid any constitutional amendments that violated fundamental rights, in particular those
46. Quoted in Ncube W., "The Courts of Law and the Legal Profession in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe: 
Lawyers Against the Law?" 1997 ZLR 32. See similar sentiment of frustration by the judiciary where 
the executive refuses to enforce their decisions in Minister of Home Affairs & Anor v Austin & Harper 
1986 (1) ZLR 240 (SC) where Dumbutshena CJ commented on the continued re-detention of South 
African spies who had been ordered free by the courts: "Preventive detentions, in those states which 
either by legislative authority or through brute force resort to them, are a matter of constant worry. 
Sometimes they create unnecessary conflict between the judiciary, which is the custodian of the rights 
of the citizens who seek protection in the courts, and the executive, the guardian of the security of the 
State. When the executive ignores the orders and judgements of the courts there is the inevitable 
breakdown of law and order, resulting in uncivilised chaos because the courts cannot enforce their 
own orders. Their jurisdiction and duty end after the delivery of the judgement. The history of this 
case leans more towards that which is undesirable than that which is desirable in order to uphold the 
rule of law.", at p 245.
47. Davis et al, supra note 140 at p 36 gives a fascinating account of the history of tension between the 
judiciary and executive in India in the first few decades of independence, in particular over property 
rights. The reformist Nehru government had sought to appropriate private property with minimum 
compensation if any at all, in large scale social engineering public purpose schemes and had enacted 
constitutional amendments making the issue of compensation non-justifiable. In a series of decisions 
starting with Golak Hath v State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 the court held that fundamental rights, 
including property rights, were sovereign and could not be infringed by Parliament in whatever 
circumstance. There was massive political agitation against such decisions led by the Congress Party, 
which after winning an overwhelming majority in the 1971 elections, passed constitutional 
amendments overturning Golak Hath. In the case of Kesavananda v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 the 
court made a partial back down by upholding the amendments as far as holding that the right to 
property was not a fundamental feature to the Constitution but still upheld the general concept of 
"essential features" of the Constitution. The day after the judgement the Gandhi government appointed 
as Chief Justice a pro-government judge, over the heads of three other senior judges, which led to 
their resignation. Soon thereafter, during the State of Emergency which followed, in particular after 
the circulation of government constitutional proposals in which independent judicial review would 
not be recognised, the court became even more pliant and acquiescent with executive decisions.
In the USA after a series of decisions opposing the reformative social legislation of President 
Roosevelt's New Deal, the courts were forced to back down after President Roosevelt threatened to 
"pack" the courts with his own people. The backdown started in West Coast Hotel Co. v Pairish 300 US 
379 (1937) dealing with the validity of state legislation mandating a minimum wage for women and 
minors. In upholding such legislation, the court hammered on the concept of economic due process 
holding that "Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, 
and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the 
community is due process." See Goldman S., supra note 179 p 44 and 459.
48. The judges were forced to confront this reality in the famous case of Madzimbamuto & Bamn v Lardner- 
Burke & Ors 1968 (2) SA 286, in which the judges were faced with the issue of whether to recognise the
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making the compensation issue on land acquisition inviolable, there was an outcry from 
the government.49 President Mugabe made "a  public invitation to the Chief Justice to 
resign..."  if he did not like the laws passed by parliament.50 The Chief Justice did not take 
the challenge, and like Beadle CJ before him, decided for his own good to adapt and 
acquiesce before the executive power. This judicial retreat was brutally exposed in the 
Bonus Case, Chairman PSC & Ors v ZIMTA & Ors,51 in which government had openly and 
flagrantly stopped payment of bonuses on the eleventh hour in open violation of the literal 
wording of the relevant regulations. In approving the same, on behalf of the majority, 
Gubbay CJ said:
It is immaterial that the legislative measure may be unreasonable, impolitic or 
retrospective or that it impinges on existing rights. If that which is passed into law is 
within the scope of the power conferred and violates no restriction on that power, it 
must be upheld whatever the court may think of it.
Other examples have followed. The courts have ingeniously used technicalities to evade 
the issue of the constitutionality of over-sweeping presidential powers, as contained in s5 
of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act,52 and s !5 8  of the Electoral Act;53
laws of the UDI regime. Most of the bench, including Beadle CJ sided with the regime, whilst Fieldsend 
J concurred with High Court judges, Lewis and Golding, who had declared the new regime's laws 
illegal. Fieldsend and another High Court judge, D Young resigned in 1968 when the government 
rejected the jurisdiction of the British Privy Council over Rhodesia. See Goldin B., The Judge, the 
Prince and the Usurper — From UDI to Zimbabwe (Vantage Press, New York, 1990) as reviewed by 
Hlatshwayo B., "Judging the Judges" (1991-1992) 9-10 Zim. L. Rev. 191 for an account from one of the 
judges over the "choices" that the judges faced at the time. See dilemma that faced the Dumbutshena 
Court in its stiff with the executive over preventive detentions, ibid.
49. Hlatshwayo B., supra note 140.
50. The Supreme Court has also come under sustained attack from other members of the executive. In 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace v Attorney General 1993 (1) ZLR 242 the court had upheld the 
argument that a four-year delay in executing prisoners on death row, after the president had declined 
to exercise his prerogative of mercy, was in violation of sl5 of the Constitution, prohibiting inhuman 
and degrading treatment. The Attorney General, in response to the judgement, blasted the judgement 
as "a determined, unashamed and blatant move ... to usurp powers which under our Constitution 
are vested in the Executive." The judgement was soon overturned by a constitutional amendment, 
validating such delays. See also, Ncube W., "Supreme Court Didn't Usurp Powers Vested in Executive", 
(1993) Vol. 5, No. 3 Legal Forum, 9.
51. 1996 (1) ZLR (T il (S). For a critique of the majority decision see, The Reviewer, "A Retreat of Judicial 
Review", (1996) Vol. 8 Legal Forum 11.
52. S v Gatzi; S v Rufaro Hotel (PVT) Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR 7. In the case of Forum Party of Zimbabwe & Ors v 
Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development & Ors S -129-97 the court shied away from 
the constitutional issue on the basis that Parliament's subsequent validation of the offensive regulations 
was adequate. See Goredema C., "Policing the Perimeter of Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Critique of 
the Decision in Forum Party o f Zimbabwe & Ors v Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban 
Development & Ors", (1997) Vol. 9, No. 4 Legal Forum 31.
53. Chapter 2:01. Subsection 2(c) thereof empowering the President to make statutory instruments which
can validate anything done in an election which is in contravention of the Act or "any other law"__
In United Parties v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Ors 1997(2) ZLR 254(S) the court 
refused to entertain a challenge on this section. The court refused to entertain the application merely 
on the basis that there was no such statutory instrument yet in existence. But the issue is not so much 
that, as it is whether in a democratic society it is permissible to delegate such powers to an incumbent. 
See S v Gatzi, supra.
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have accepted the diminution of workers' rights that have already been contractually 
established,54 and denied due process of law to striking civil servants.55
If there were still any doubting Thomases about the new direction of the court —  its new 
marriage with the executive in the suppression of liberal democracy, the speech of the 
Chief Justice at the Opening of the 1998 Legal Year on 12 January, must have laid those to 
rest. The speech which closely followed the first ever post-1980 general strike, the historic 
and violent 9 December 1997 ZCTU Mass Stay-Away, made clear that in a toss-up between 
fundamental rights and the interests of law and order the courts would favour the latter, 
including using a restrictive approach to constitutional interpretation against rights in order 
to realise "an effective criminal justice system". He went on to declare his requiem on In Re 
Munhumeso et al, in such eloquent terms:
The 'living tree' approach to constitutional interpretation does not give free reign to 
graft on new branches. The search for truth should not be unnecessarily frustrated by 
values which have not been sanctioned by the constitutional process.56
The retreat of the Gubbay court is not surprising. In an era of accelerating class conflict due 
to the rising crisis of capitalism, the artificial divisions and tensions within the bourgeois 
state are increasingly washed away in the face of the need to contain the rising plebeians. 
In such times greater power is vested in the executive whilst bourgeois democratic niceties 
are thrown aside. As Karl Marx observed:
The restraints by which their own divisions had under former regimes still checked 
the state power, were removed by their union; and in view of the threatening upheaval 
of the proletariat, they now used that state power mercilessly and ostentatiously as 
the natural war engine of capital against labour. In their uninterpreted crusade against 
the producing masses they were, however, bound not only to invest the executive 
with continually increased powers of repression, but at the same time to divest their 
own parliamentary stronghold, the National Assembly, one by one of all its own means 
of defence against the executive.57
CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that in the last two years, which have been characterised by rising 
working class militancy, the judiciary has beat a retreat on its earlier tentative steps of 
expanding bourgeois democratic rights and has increasingly deferred to the executive arm  
of the state in defence of bourgeois private property and even Zanu(PF) authoritarianism.
The courts have shrunk away from the contextual model of interpretation that it promised in 
Zimnat Insurance Co. v Chawanda, as a general shift to the right marked by reliance on the 
narrow literalist interpretation model, now characterises the Zimbabwe bench under Chief 
Justice Gubbay. Regrettably for liberal democracy, the court's newly found marriage with 
such model of interpretation is likely to see the judicial upholding of the Presidential Powers
54. Chairman, Public Service Commission & Ors v Zimbabwe Teachers Association & Ors 1997 (1) SA 209 (SC). 
See minority judgement.
55. Jiah & Ors v Public Service Commission b  Anor.
56. (1998) Vol. 10, No. 1 Legal Foi um 4.
57. Marx K., "The Civil War in France" in Marx and Engels: Selected Works Vol. 2 (Progress Publishers, 
Moscow) p 286.
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(Temporary Measures) (Labour Relations) Regulations, 1998, and with that the legitimising 
of the impending fascist dictatorship.58
In the final analysis the bourgeois myth of separation of powers cannot stand the heat of 
accelerated class struggle engendered by economic crisis under capitalism. To end with 
the Russian revolutionary V. I. Lenin:
No laws on earth can abolish inequality and exploitation so long as production for the 
market continues, and so long as there is the rule of money and the power of capital.59
The implications for the working classes are clear: the misplaced reliance of earlier years 
on class-partisan institutions like the courts can only lead to tragedy —  as observed 
elsewhere:
Already the stay-aways of the past year have shown that only organised resistance at 
the point of production can force the exploiting classes, their government and courts 
to award reforms, in fear of revolution. The only way forward to break the Regulations 
and the impending dictatorship is a resolute intensification of the general strikes and 
mass civil disobedience.60
58. Similar sentiments have been expressed by some segments of the ruling classes themselves as shown 
by editorials in various bourgeois papers. See for instance: "Paying the Price of Mis-govemance"(Ed.), 
The Zimbabwe Independent, 6 November 1998, p 4; "Mr. President, Please Listen to Your Subjects" (Ed.) 
Zimbabwe Independent, 13 November 1998, p 5; "Mr. President, You are Now a Liability"(Ed), The 
Zimbabwe Independent, 20 November 1998, p 4; " Is Zimbabwe Under a Military Dictatorship?" (Ed.) 
The Financial Gazette, 12 November 1998; "Nail Fist Will Fail" (Ed.), The Financial Gazette, 3 December 
1998, p 8; "Who are Mugabe's Advisors?"(Ed.), The Sunday Standard, 29 November 1998, p 8.
59. V.I. Lenin, "The Land Question and the Fight for Freedom", Collected Works, Vol. 1 (Progress Publishers,
Moscow, 1978). On the limitations of bourgeois liberal democracy, also see Makamure K., 
"Constitutional Theory and Practice for the Transition From Capitalism to Scientific Socialism" (1987) 
5 Zim. L. Rev. 108,110.
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